Introduction
Prospecting rights over two farms in the magisterial district of Sekhukhuneland, respectively. The judgment in the Constitutional Court departed significantly from the approach taken in the previous courts, where the engagement with the issues had been overwhelmingly procedural. The Constitutional Court decided the case on both the procedural issues and the substantive grounds of review overwhelmingly in favour of Bengwenyama Minerals, at the same time setting a significant precedent on issues relating to consultation with landowners and preferential treatment for communities, and to a lesser extent on the role of environmental considerations in the granting of prospecting rights. The purpose of this note is to provide a brief outline of the range of issues raised in these three cases and how they were resolved, to relate what happened subsequent to the case, and to evaluate the significance of the precedent in respect of a number of issues that have bedeviled The MPRDA was enacted to provide for both equitable access to and sustainable development of South Africa's mineral resources. Developed under the auspices of the constitutional project to advance equality, dignity and freedom 11 its objects include promoting equitable access to the nation's mineral resources, substantially and meaningfully expanding opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons to enter the minerals industry, giving effect to the constitutional environmental right, and ensuring that the holders of mining rights contribute toward the socio-economic development of the areas in which they operate.
12
One of the sea-changes introduced by the Act was the introduction of a concessionary form of mineral exploitation with the State assuming custodianship of all mineral resources and arrogating to itself the right to grant prospecting and mining rights to suitably-qualified applicants. 13 Previously, under the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (as well as at earlier points in South Africa's mining history), rights to minerals were granted by the owners of land or, where the owner had severed the mineral rights from the land, by the holder of the mineral rights. A licence from the State to exploit such minerals was then additionally required. 14 As a result of the MPRDA's introduction of the concept of State custodianship of minerals, the rights of landowners over mineral resources "disappeared into thin air" 15 and with it the tacit need for them to consent to prospecting for minerals on their land. As a palliative to the inevitable conflict this would generate between surface rights owners and the holders of prospecting or mining rights, 16 the MPRDA introduced the need for Resources as well as applicants for prospecting and mining rights to notify and consult with landowners over the proposed applications. Additionally, in line with the broad transformational thrust of the legislation, section 104 recognises that communities in whose name land is registered may wish to prospect or mine on such land. This section allows for the community to be granted a preferent right to prospect for any mineral on such land if upon application to the Minister they can prove: (i) that the right will be used to contribute to the development and social upliftment of the community concerned (as outlined in a development plan); (ii) the envisaged benefits of the project will accrue to the community in question; and (iii) the community has access to technical and financial resources to exercise such a right. 18 A preferent right to prospect or mine, however, may not be granted in respect of areas where such rights have already been granted.
19
As regards the sustainable development of mineral resources, the Act's provisions centre on the preparation of a fairly rigorous environmental management plan or programme (EMP).
20
While these objects are laudable enough, recent research points to a variety of problems in implementation. In a review of mining and environment litigation undertaken by the Centre for Environmental Rights in collaboration with Wits Law School, it was found that there are significant issues relating to the process of consultation such as a failure to provide landowners with adequate notice of the pending application, a lack of access to information, and a failure to meet the "proper" requirements of consultation. 21 It is also claimed that prescribed processes and content relating to the EMP frequently lack integrity; for instance, the apparent approval of the EMP after the grant of the prospecting or mining right. 22 A number of issues relating to the granting and resolution of administrative appeals were also raised, such as a failure to suspend the operation whilst the appeal is being decided and a lack of clarity about when the appeal is concluded.
23
With this context in mind, I turn now to an analysis of the facts and issues raised in the Bengwenyama trilogy.
The facts
The Bengwenyama had ostensibly enjoyed uninterrupted occupation of the farm Nooitverwacht for more than a century. Minerals' application for prospecting rights over the two farms was submitted on 14
July 2006 and accepted some two weeks later. Like Genorah, they were asked to submit an EMP by a particular date. They were informed, however, that there were five earlier applications for the same minerals on the same properties, one of which was the application submitted by Genorah. 35 By mid-September 2006 the investment agreement between Bengwenyama Minerals and the community had been finalised and the Kgoshi wrote to the DME stating his concurrence and approval of Bengwenyama Minerals acting as a "black empowered enterprise" on behalf of the community. 36 In October he again communicated with the DME, stating his surprise at having learned about the other prospecting applications lodged against the farms and noting his concern that Genorah and the other applicants had failed to meet or consult with the community. 
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The availability of an internal appeal rested upon the prior factual question: who actually decided to grant the prospecting right? The DMR, it appears, has somewhat convoluted administrative procedures in place with decisions and actions being spread between its head office (in Tshwane) and the regional offices where the applications are actually lodged (and where consideration of the EMP also takes place). According to evidence submitted by the DMR, the official who applied his mind to the application was the deputy Director-General, who acted in terms of powers defined in a Ministerial delegation of 12 May 2004. 44 At the time of deciding to grant the right, the deputy Director-General also signed a power of attorney authorising the Regional Manager to attend to the notarial execution of the prospecting right. 45 What mattered to the judges of the Transvaal Provincial Division and the Supreme Court of Appeal was not that the prospecting right bore the signature of the Regional Manager, but if he had authority to introduce any "independent decisions" into the grant of the right. The facts supported the conclusion that the Regional Manager was, in the words of Hartzenberg J, a "mere scribe" and the courts accordingly held that the Director-General made the decision.
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The two courts, however, differed on the implications of this finding for the question of whether or not a further appeal from this decision was allowed to the Minister.
Hartzenberg J decided that when the deputy Director-General took the decision, he did so on behalf of the Minister -the decision was thus that of the Minister, 47 and the only remedy available to the applicants was a judicial review. As this had been brought out of time (359 days after the decision was taken), the application failed on that ground alone. (4) and (5) of the MPRDA as well as the content of the 2004 delegation, the courts in these cases concluded that the delegation of power to the deputy Director-General was a form of deconcentration and no appeal was therefore available.
The Supreme Court of Appeal, relying on Baxter's Administrative Law, 52 came to a different conclusion: that the delegatee acted in his own right and was responsible for the exercise of his power. There had been a "full" delegation of powers to the deputy Director-General. 53 Having relied on a strict interpretation of regulation 74 (4) of the MPRDA regulations, the court concluded that the Minister had not formally condoned the late lodging of the appeal. Because Bengwenyama Minerals had not pursued a condonation request, its rights under section 7 of PAJA had to be assessed on the basis that it had abandoned the appeal. 54 Thus the Supreme Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion as the court a quo, albeit by a different route: the appellants were out of time with the 180-day judicial review deadline.
55
The Constitutional Court approached this issue from a different point of orientation than that adopted by the two prior courts. The starting point for an analysis of delegation as a legal concept, the court held, had to be the demands of the Constitution itself. 56 It was a "practical necessity" of modern government that functions assigned by the Constitution and legislation often needed to be performed by administrative officials. While delegation was distinguished from assignment in the delegator retaining final control over the decision taken by the delegatee in her Whilst agreeing with the Supreme Court of Appeal on the existence of the internal appeal, the Constitutional Court ignored the emphasis they had placed on the formal condonation of the late lodging of the appeal. Pointing to the fact that section 7(1)(a) of the PAJA requires that judicial proceedings must be instituted "without unreasonable delay" and not later than 180 days after internal remedies "have been concluded", the court found that the internal appeal had been concluded in the sense required of this section when the DMR responded to the appellant's appeal on 14
June 2007. 60 The court found that it could hardly be said that there was any deliberate delay in the steps Bengwenyama Minerals and the Community had taken to correct what they considered to be an unlawful granting of prospecting rights. "The only true culpable delay", the court held, "was that of the Department who took more than four months to respond to the internal appeal." 61 The review was thus brought in time.
Substantive grounds of review
The three substantive issues on which the Constitutional Court made a definitive interpretation of the MPRDA related to consultation requirements, communities' preferent rights, and the place of environmental considerations in the granting of a prospecting right. The Constitutional Court, in contrast, came out in support of a far more rigorous "good faith" standard in relation to the consultation requirements. Its deliberations in this regard were framed by a particular view on the nature of prospecting rights as representing "a grave and considerable invasion of the use and enjoyment of the land on which the prospecting is to happen." 65 The different notice and consultation requirements were indicative of a "serious concern for the rights and interests of landowners and lawful occupiers in the process of granting prospecting rights". The purpose of these requirements therefore had to be related to the impact that the granting of a prospecting right would have on a landowner or lawful occupier. 66 The court accordingly held that the consultation requirements in the Act served at least two general purposes. The first was to see if some accommodation was possible between the prospecting right applicant and the landowner insofar as interference with the landowner's property was concerned. "Of course the Act does not impose agreement on these issues …" noted the court, "but that does not mean that consultation under the Act's provisions does not require engaging in good faith to attempt to reach accommodation in that regard." 67 The second was to provide landowners or occupiers with the necessary information on everything to be done in respect of the prospecting operation, so that they could make an informed decision, for instance, whether to object to the application or take it on appeal or review. It was therefore important to inform the landowner "in sufficient detail" of what the prospecting operation would entail on the land so that the landowner could properly assess what its impact would be. 
Compliance with the consultation requirements

Communities' preferent right to prospect
Both the Transvaal Provincial Division and the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the application initially lodged by Bengwenyama Minerals was an "out-and-out application" for a prospecting right in terms of section 16, and not an application for a community preferent right to prospect in terms of section 104. 69 Much significance was therefore attached to the reliance on section 104, which was raised only in Bengwenyama Minerals' supplemental appeal of 9 March 2007, being an "afterthought".
The Constitutional Court, by contrast, placed great store in the Department's awareness of the fact that they were dealing with a "community" on the basis of the nature and content of the communications that took place during 2006 and even prior to that. 70 The court found that the MPRDA creates a special category of rights for "communities", namely a preferent right to prospect on their own land. As noted above, such a right cannot be granted where a prospecting right has already been issued to another party in respect of communal land. Any application for a prospecting right under section 16 would therefore have the effect of disentitling a community of its right to apply for a preferent prospecting right. Since their right would be materially and adversely affected, before a prospecting right could be granted in these circumstances (presumably when it related to communal land), the community concerned had to (i) be informed by the Department of the application and its consequences, and (ii) be given an opportunity to make representations in regard thereto. In an appropriate case that would include an opportunity to bring a section 104 application prior to a decision being made on a section 16 application submitted by another party. 71 Because the Department "was at all times aware that the community wished to acquire prospecting rights on its own farms", the court held that it had an obligation (founded on section 3 of PAJA) to directly inform the community and Bengwenyama Minerals of Genorah's application and its potentially adverse consequences for their own preferent rights, to make representations in relation thereto, and to make a section 104 application before Genorah's application was decided. 
Environmental considerations in the granting of a prospecting right
There were a number of sub-issues related to the broader question of the role environmental considerations play in the granting of a prospecting right. These included the appellants' contentions regarding the late approval of the EMP (i.e. more than 120 days after it had been lodged); Genorah's failure to provide financial provision for the rehabilitation or management of environmental impacts prior to the granting of the prospecting right; and that the EMP had been approved by an acting
Regional Manager (i.e. not by the official who had granted the prospecting right).
Hartzenberg J in the Transvaal Provincial Division remarked obiter that MPRDA provisions in respect of environmental requirements may be "less mandatory" so that certain deviations from what the Act requires may be acceptable. It all depended on the construction of the particular provision. 73 The Supreme Court of Appeal almost completely sidestepped deciding these issues, confining itself to the observation that they failed to see how the environmental sub-issues could affect the validity of the right or its coming into effect, whilst the decision to approve the EMP had not been set aside (thus assuming that the approval of the EMP was a separate administrative action).
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In the case before the Constitutional Court, counsel for Genorah argued that environmental satisfaction was not a jurisdictional fact for the granting of a prospecting right based on the wording of section 17(5) of the Act (which provides that the granting of a prospecting right in terms of section 17(1) "becomes effective"
on the date on which the EMP is approved). The Constitutional Court rejected this argument, pointing to a distinction between the approval of the prospecting right and its implementation. 75 While they were clear in stating that approval of the prospecting operation "is dependent on an assessment that the operation will not result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment" 76 -thus affirming that environmental considerations are part of the jurisdictional facts relating to the grant of a prospecting right -they were largely silent on what this meant, practically, for the approval of the EMP and financial provision for the rehabilitation or management of negative environmental impacts (though they seemed to disapprove of the fact, for instance, that the EMP was "approved" by an acting Regional Manager two months after the granting of the right). Almost six months passed before the Community learnt that their application had once again been refused, this time because they did not own the land in question.
The Bengwenyama dispute this: their land claim for Eerstegeluk, of which they were dispossessed a number of times, was lodged some thirteen years ago and is still being processed, whilst they claim to have been in occupation of Nooitverwacht for more than one hundred years. The DMR nevertheless re-awarded the prospecting rights to Eerstegeluk to Genorah Resources and the Pedi-aligned Roka-Pashe Community; and awarded the prospecting right to Nooitverwacht to two gentlemen who claim to represent the Bengwenyama Community but whose authenticity the Bengwenyama Tribal Council questions. In 2011 the Bengwenyama community therefore reinstated review proceedings to have these prospecting rights set aside, and the matter is still pending.
Discussion
The Constitutional Court's judgment in this trilogy provides welcome clarity on some of the interpretive uncertainties that have bedeviled implementation of the MPRDA.
These include the existence of an internal appeal, the nature of consultation, the role of environmental considerations in the granting of prospecting rights, and the procedural obligations of the DMR in relation to the community preferent right to prospect or mine. These are discussed under the headings below.
The existence of an internal appeal
It is now clear that an internal appeal against the granting of a prospecting or mining right exists under the MPRDA. In the ordinary course of events, therefore, it would be necessary for any party to submit an appeal against the granting of such a right prior to instituting judicial review proceedings. The court's finding that the appeal was "concluded" when the Minister responded to the applicants on 14 June 2007 is also helpful as it shows that courts are prepared to recognise the closure of the process even where there has not been official closure in the sense of the appeal having been decided. Whilst this does much to dispel some of the uncertainty that previously prevailed, it does not address the concern that where the object of the appeal is the protection of the environmental resource base this may be undermined by the fact that no time limits are set on the Minister deciding the appeal and that it is in her discretion to suspend the operation of the prospecting or mining right while the appeal is being granted. In practice the Minister almost never grants a request to suspend the relevant right 79 and the appeal takes months -or even years -to finalise, during which time the environmental resource base is frequently degraded.
For example, in the Xolobeni case on the Wild Coast the community's appeal against the granting of a mining right in respect of titanium-rich sands was decided nearly three years after it was initially submitted, and then only after the community had lodged a complaint with the Public Protector. 
The duty to consult
The Constitutional Court's affirmation of a "good faith" standard for public participation is significant. The overwhelming impression of the public participation process followed by Genorah in this case is that it was a perfunctory formality. A good faith standard should require that mining applicants invest more time and money in the public participation process. Forms of engagement where the consultants employed by mining companies simply leave a form for the landowner to complete or where there is no evidence of an attempt to engage with the concerns landowners raise should no longer be acceptable. Where the DMR nevertheless grants prospecting and mining rights applications in these circumstances, they are now vulnerable to being set aside on review on the basis of their shortfall from the good faith standard.
It is also significant that the court emphasised the need for providing "necessary information" concerning the application, though it seems that the group who will benefit from these interpretations is restricted to landowners. The Constitutional
Court was somewhat parsimonious in its identification of the "necessary information" that needs to be made available and it would have been better if they had outlined this in greater detail. Together with a prospecting rights application, for instance, an applicant must submit a prospecting and works programme that sets out the nature of the proposed operation, and yet this document is routinely withheld from the parties with whom applicants interact for the purpose of the consultation process.
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The Constitutional Court's identification of an "outcomes-based" standard (all of the information necessary for the landowner to assess the impact of the proposed operation), however, is a broad one that should include, at the very least, the prospecting and works programme.
The "lopsidedness" 82 of a system where landowner consent is not required in order for prospecting or mining to commence on land was not interrogated in this case.
Depending on the outcome of the Agri South Africa case currently before the Supreme Court of Appeal, 83 where the court will decide whether the MPRDA expropriated landowners' mineral rights and whether compensation is accordingly payable, the constitutionality of this model in terms of the right to a clean environment and the right to property may come under scrutiny in future.
The role of environmental considerations
The court's affirmation that environmental considerations are part of the jurisdictional facts for the granting of a prospecting right is important, notwithstanding that this should have been abundantly clear from the provisions of the MPRDA, which states that the Minister may grant a prospecting right only if she is satisfied that the prospecting will not result in "unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment". 84 However, while this case highlights some of the curiosities of the DMR's practices relating to the approval of the EMP (the split between the approval of the EMP at regional level and the granting of the right at a central level, for instance, or the fact that the EMP is routinely "approved" after the granting of the right), it does not go far enough in examining them and deciding if they conform to constitutional and statutory standards regarding the integration of The amended definition posits "community" as:
[A] group of historically disadvantaged persons with interest or rights in a particular area of land on which the members have or exercise communal rights in terms of an agreement, custom or law. Provided that, where as a consequence of the provisions of this act, negotiations or consultations with the community is required, Although the amended definition seems to recognise the possibility of a nonhomogenous community, it still links the definition of community to the chaotic state of communal land tenure in South African law.
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It is also problematic that section 104 of the MPRDA states, as a criterion of eligibility for the lodging of a preferent right, that the land in question "is registered or to be registered in the name of the community concerned." The reference to possible future registration ("to be registered") rightly takes into account the possibility of a community having a land claim to a particular piece of land, but this in turn is then linked to the problems that arise from the glacial pace at which land claims are seemingly processed. It seems entirely unacceptable that the Bengwenyama community's land claim to Eerstegeluk, for example, is still unprocessed thirteen years down the line and that their lack of ownership was then used by the DMR as the primary reason for refusing their second application for a preferent right to prospect.
Conclusion
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Bengwenyama matter is ostensibly a welcome one for clarifying the existence of an internal appeal and affirming the role of environmental considerations in the granting of prospecting rights. However, its deliberations on the duty to consult and particularly the procedural implications of the community preferent right to prospect do not go far enough into the dynamics underlying the implementation of the law or address the problematic relationship between the MPRDA, the law relating to communal land tenure, and the processing of land claims. 
